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We perform laboratory experiments to elucidate the role of historical information in games involv-
ing human coordination. Our approach follows prior work studying human network coordination
using the task of graph coloring. We first motivate this research by showing empirical evidence that
the resolution of coloring conflicts is dependent upon the recent local history of that conflict. We
also conduct two tailored experiments to manipulate the game history that can be used by humans
in order to determine (i) whether humans use historical information, and (ii) whether they use it
effectively. In the first variant, during the course of each coloring task, the network positions of the
subjects were periodically swapped while maintaining the global coloring state of the network. In
the second variant, participants completed a series of 2-coloring tasks, some of which were restarts
from checkpoints of previous tasks. Thus, the participants restarted the coloring task from a point
in the middle of a previous task without knowledge of the history that led to that point. We report
on the game dynamics and average completion times for the diverse graph topologies used in the
swap and restart experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are numerous examples in which humans must
coordinate in order to accomplish a collective goal. Na-
tional political parties coordinate through networks of lo-
cal party chapters. The Obama campaign famously used
Twitter and Facebook to coordinate with supporters and
potential followers. Companies must choose which soft-
ware to use, balancing the benefits of a useful application
with the disadvantages of being incompatible with other
companies. Friends perform decentralized communica-
tion to decide on which bar to frequent.
In many of these cases, full communication between
parties is not possible. Instead, each person can only
communicate with a small subset of the larger group,
thus forming a communication network over which coor-
dination must occur.
We would like to understand the decision making pro-
cess that humans employ when coordinating over net-
works. Much of the prior modeling work has assumed
that humans base their strategic decisions solely on the
current local state of their network, e.g. on the current
behavior of friends, family, or colleagues. But when mak-
ing choices in life we also often take into account past
behavior of those with whom we interact. Over time, we
develop rich behavioral models of friends, family, compa-
nies, and political parties. These models of our network
neighbors influence how we ourselves behave.
Thus it seems natural to try to understand how the
historical behavior of network neighbors influences the
ability to coordinate over a network. Do humans use
historical information in coordination games, and do they
use it to their advantage?
To begin answering these questions, we have conducted
a series of human-subject experiments and simulations.
We follow prior work by Kearns et al. [1–3], and follow-
ups [4, 5], in modeling human network coordination using
he task of graph coloring. Our experiments attempt to
manipulate the game history that can be used by humans
in order to determine (i) whether humans use historical
information, and (ii) whether they use it effectively.
When coordinating over a network, humans may em-
ploy several different uses of history. For example, over
the course of many coordination tasks, they may de-
velop models of coordination that influence their strate-
gic choices. However, in this work we are interested in a
different use of history. In particular, we are interested
in quantifying how much recent history humans use to in-
fluence their decisions in the current coordination task.
Previous work has addressed history usage in human
coordination tasks over networks. Israeli et al. [6] showed
that simple algorithms that could plausibly be executed
by humans benefit from small amounts of history. Other
work focuses on generating predictive models of human
behavior [7, 8] or determining whether participants pro-
vided with algorithmic instructions achieve significantly
better performance [9]. Our work focuses on detecting
and understanding the effect of history usage.
II. EVIDENCE FOR HISTORY USAGE IN
HUMAN COORDINATION
In each of the human-subject experiments we con-
ducted, each of 16 subjects sat at a computer through
which he could control the color of a node in a network.
Each subject was only able to see the colors of his imme-
diate network neighbors, so he could not explicitly know
the global coloring state of the network. All subjects re-
ceived one dollar if they were able to 2-color the network
in under three minutes. No subjects received any money
if this did not occur. During each three minute session,
subjects could change their own color as often as they
wanted while seeing, in real time, their neighbors’ color
changes. The sessions were repeated a number of times
with the same set of participants over the course of two
hours. We call this the standard protocol.
We have conducted two such human-subject 2-coloring
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2FIG. 1: The averages completion time of the swap experiment for each network topology.
experiments. We used five different network topologies
over the two experiments. In the first experiment, sub-
jects performed the 2-coloring task on a random 3-regular
bipartite graph and on a simple cycle in which each node
had on extra cord (figure 2(a)). In the second exper-
iment, subjects performed the tasks on a simple cycle
with no cords, a barbell network consisting of two cycles
connected by a single edge, and a line graph (figure 2(b)).
In the two experiments, some of the sessions had a pro-
tocol that was slightly modified from the standard proto-
col. The modified protocols were tailored to understand
usage of history by the subjects. These modified proto-
cols are described in the following section. First, we pro-
vide a simple analysis of the sessions with the standard
protocol. This analysis gives evidence that subjects use
historical information when resolving conflicting edges,
showing a strong directionality to the traversal of con-
flicts through the networks.
A conflicting edge is one whose two end points have the
same color. The analysis considers each time a conflicting
edge is resolved, i.e. when one of the endpoints changes
color so that the endpoints are no longer the same color.
If we assume that subjects do not use any history of past
events, then by symmetry each end point is equally likely
to resolve the conflict by changing its own color.
However, it is conceivable that subjects use history of
a conflicting neighbor’s most recent color change when
making the decision to resolve the conflict. Indeed, in
post-experimental questionnaires, many subjects did re-
port using neighbors’ most recent color change as a factor
in their own color choices.
This leads to a simple analysis of the data, one which
allows the timing of a neighbor’s most recent color change
to be a factor in a subject’s resolution of conflicts. We
count the number of times that the following occurs: the
endpoint that resolves a conflicting edge has switched his
color less recently than the other endpoint of the conflict-
ing edge. Then divide this by the total number of times
a conflicting edge is resolved. We call this fraction the
conflict resolution bias Again by symmetry, if subjects do
not use any history, the conflict resolution bias should be
0.5. Subjects would not be concerned with how recently
their neighbors have changed.
We can compute the conflict resolution bias for the
standard protocol sessions for each of the two experi-
ments that we have run. Each experiment used a different
set of 16 subjects. For one experiment the conflict resolu-
tion bias was 0.77 over 930 instances of conflicting edges
being resolved. For the other experiment, the conflict
resolution bias was 0.41 over 523 instances of conflicting
edges being resolved. Both values are different than the
bias of 0.5 that is expected if subjects use no history.
This suggests that subjects are using recent history. It
also implies that conflicts travel in the network with a
certain directionality.
However, the values are also on opposite sides of 0.5.
This suggests the following explanation. Subjects use
the timing of their neighbors’ recent moves when mak-
ing decisions, but they use this timing information in
different ways. Some subjects may prioritize resolving
conflicts with stably colored neighbors while other sub-
jects resolve conflicts with neighbors who have changed
recently. These two strategies have opposing effects on
the conflict resolution bias. It may be the case that the
distribution of the two strategies varies from group to
group and thus so does the conflict resolution bias.
This analysis only captures a very simple use of his-
tory. We hope that the modified experiments presented
in section III will detect and show the effect of potentially
more elaborate uses of history.
III. EXPERIMENTS
We have conducted two variants of these graph color-
ing experiments in order to understand the use of his-
tory in human coordination games. In the first variant,
which we call the swap experiment, the network posi-
tions of the subjects were periodically swapped during
the three minute sessions, while maintaining the global
3(a)Swap experiment topologies (from left to right): random
3-regular, cycle with cords.
(b)Restart experiment topologies (from left to right): line, barbell,
simple cycle.
FIG. 2: Experimental topologies.
coloring state of the network. In other words, every k
seconds, the subjects were randomly assigned to a node
in the network. The color of each node in the network
remained constant across the swap. Thus, a subject may
control a red node prior to a swap and a blue node after
the swap though he made no decision to change color.
With high probability each subject’s neighbors changed
after each random assignment, so any history of neigh-
bor behavior is effectively erased. Thus, subjects could
only use historical knowledge from a limited time window
since the last swap. This window was at most k seconds.
We varied the frequency with which subjects are
swapped in order to test the effect of changing the size
of the window of historical information that can be used
by the subjects. Within each session, the swapping fre-
quency remained constant, but different sessions had dif-
ferent swapping frequencies. In the single experiment
that we have run, we swapped subjects every 5 seconds,
every 10 seconds, and never.
The instances of swapping can be potentially confusing
for the subjects, so we provided an interface that allowed
them to have a ”context switching” period. When the
swap occured, each subject was shown a screen that dis-
played his new node’s color and each of his new neighbor-
ing node’s colors. This screen was grayed out for a period
of 3 seconds during which time the subjects could not
change their colors. After the 3 second context switching
period, the game resumed. The 3 second context switch-
ing time did not count towards the three minute session
time limit.
We used two different topologies (figure 2(a)) for the
swap experiment, a random 3-regular graph and a cycle
with one cord per node. These topologies were designed
with two goals in mind. High diameter graphs tend to
have longer expected completion time for 2-coloring [1].
This is advantageous for the swap experiment because it
maximizes the number of swaps that will occur before
completion, thus maximizing the number of treatments
per session. We used constant degree graphs in order to
reduce confusion and unintended treatments from swap-
ping subjects between nodes of varying degrees.
In the second variant, the experiment proceeded in two
phases. In the first phase, the subjects performed a series
of 2-coloring sessions in which all network nodes begin
with no color. This is the standard protocol described in
section II. In the second phase, the subjects performed
another series of 2 coloring sessions in which the initial
color of each node was taken from a 30 second or 5 second
checkpoint of a session from the first phase. Thus, the
subjects restarted the coloring task from a point in the
middle of a previous session. However, they did not know
from which session they were restarting, so they had no
knowledge of the history of color changes that led to the
checkpoint.
More precisely, from each session in phase 1 that lasted
more than 35 seconds, we saved snapshots of the state of
the session at 5 seconds and at 30 seconds. A snapshot
is a mapping of participants to nodes and from nodes
to current color at that point in time. In phase 2, the
subjects were restarted from one of these snapshots. This
means that subjects were mapped to the same nodes as
in the snapshot, and nodes began with the same color as
in the snapshot.
We used three different topologies (figure 2(b)) for the
restart experiment, a simple cycle with no cords, a bar-
bell network consisting of two cycles connected by a sin-
gle edge, and a line graph. These graphs were selected to
maximize the expected time to completion, thus reduc-
ing the expected number of session in the first phase to
complete before 35 seconds.
IV. ANALYSIS
For both experiments, we are interested in detecting
some form of history usage by the subjects and in measur-
ing its positive or negative effects. If subjects do use sig-
nificant portions of local history when making decisions,
and if that use has a significant effect on performance,
then it may be possible to detect this in completion time
for the experiments. Figure 1 gives the average comple-
tion time for the swap experiments of each topology for
4FIG. 3: The average completion time of the restart experiments for each network topology.
swaps of every 5 seconds, 10 seconds, and never.
This experiment has a number of drawbacks that result
in a difficult analysis. Swapping erases the subjects local
history knowledge, but it also may result in several un-
intended treatments including the confusion of switching
nodes and the distribution of different subject strategies
around the network during the course of the game. The
execution of the experiment also suffered from a more
practical drawback. Half of the 5 and 10 second swap
experiments completed after only one or zero swaps, thus
rendering the treatment relatively useless. A more elab-
orate analysis is needed to understand the experimental
output.
We perform a similar analysis on the restart experi-
ments. If we assume that there is no influence of history
on performance, then the expected time to completion
from a given checkpoint should be the same whether the
subjects continue playing through the checkpoint time
(phase 1) or whether they restart from that checkpoint
later in the experiment (phase 2). Thus, if we can de-
tect a significant difference in time to completion for the
restarts, then may provide evidence of history usage.
However, in practice there may be an effect of restart-
ing the participants from a checkpoint that has nothing
to do with history. The subjects might require a context
switching time to adapt to their new colors and those of
their neighbors, or they might be influenced to choose
colors more rapidly because of the restart. To correct
for this, we restart the participants from a 5-second and
30-second checkpoint. Restarting from a 5-second check-
point creates the restart effect without erasing much his-
tory, while the 30-second checkpoint has a restart effect
and erases a significant amount of history.
It is interesting to visualize the dynamics of the ses-
sions in the restart experiments. One way to visualize
this is to plot the evolution of the Hamming distance to
a correct coloring. The Hamming distance of a session
at a particular point in time is computed in the follow-
ing way. Pick an arbitrary 2 coloring solution. For each
node in the network, if the node is consistent with that
2 coloring, assign it value 1, if it has a color but is incon-
sistent, assign it value −1, and if it has no color, assign
it value 0. The Hamming distance of the session is the
sum of these values for all nodes.
Figure 4 describes the evolution of Hamming distance
versus time for one session from phase 1 along with the
same plot for its 5 second and 30 second restarts from
phase 2. This session was performed on the simple cycle
with no cords. The red line gives the evolution of the
Hamming distance for the phase 1 session while the blue
and black lines give that evolution for the 5 second and
30 second restarts respectively. Note the long periods of
steady increase or decrease in Hamming distance for all
three sessions represented. This is unlikely in a history-
less setting and gives some of the intuition behind the
directionality of conflicts described in section II.
We lack a formal analysis of the dynamics of the restart
experiment. In particular, we would like to formally cap-
ture any effects of the restart treatment on the dynamics
of the sessions.
Figure 3 gives the average completion times for the
three topologies used in the restart experiment. We suffer
from a small dataset (3 or 4 trials per topology) combined
with a high variance in completion time. As the plots
reveal we need a more finely tuned approach to detect
any effect of history in the experiments, given the limited
data.
The analysis described in section II offers such an ap-
proach. Unfortunately, the conflict resolution bias does
not apply to the restart experiments. The conflict resolu-
tion bias usage of historical information from the past few
seconds while the restart experiments attempt to erase
historical knowledge on longer time scales (30 seconds).
However, the swapping experiments do offer an opportu-
nity to apply the conflict resolution bias in a more inter-
esting way. In the swapping experiments, subjects’ his-
torical knowledge is erased frequently. If participants do
not use historical information, then the frequency with
5FIG. 4: Hamming distance versus time
Time Between Swaps Conflict Resolution Bias
Never swap 0.413
10 seconds 0.419
5 seconds 0.449
TABLE I: Conflict resolution bias for each swap frequency.
which they are swapped should have no effect on the con-
flict resolution bias. Thus, if the frequency of swapping
does have an effect on the conflict resolution bias, then
we have more evidence for the usage of short term history
by the subjects.
In fact, there is a small change in the conflict resolution
bias as the frequency of swapping varies. Table I gives
the conflict resolution bias for each swap frequency used
in the experiment. We note that the change in conflict
resolution bias is small. This is again a reflection of the
fact that conflict resolution bias only captures a limited
time frame of history usage. We also note that the con-
flict resolution bias tends towards 0.5 as the time between
swaps approaches 0. This is expected, as a shorter time
between swaps gives subjects less of an opportunity of
observing the timing of neighboring nodes’ most recent
color changes.
V. DISCUSSION
Our analysis focuses on crude aggregate measures (av-
erage completion time) or finely tuned measures that only
capture short term history usage. It is conceivable that
subjects are employing more elaborate, longer term us-
age of history. It may be possible to generalize conflict
resolution bias to account for richer uses of history. In ad-
dition, it is possible that different human subjects employ
different uses of history, and so it could be interesting to
understand this distribution of strategies.
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